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downward step in consumption at retirement contradicts predictions from life—cycle 
models with additively separable consumption and leisure, or with continuous work-hour 
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the drop in consumption at retirement to provide an advantageous method of identifying 
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 Estimating Life—Cycle Parameters from
Consumption Behavior at Retirement
1. Introduction
The life—cycle saving model is a cornerstone of modern economic policy analysis. Re-
searchers use the framework to study, among other topics, economic growth, business
cycles, social insurance, and trade and tax policies (e.g., Diamond [1965], Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ [1987], Lucas [1990, 2003], Hubbard et al. [1995], Altig et al. [2001], and many
others). In a number of applications, both the model’s ability to match data and the answer
it gives to economic questions depend critically on values of its parameters, especially the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. For example, see Woodford [2003,
ch.4] on macroeconomic implications, Weil [1989] on the risk free rate puzzle, Lucas [2003]
on the welfare costs of business cycles, and Jones et al. [2003] on the relationship between
volatility and growth. The importance of the model’s parameters naturally generates in-
terest in credible and precise estimates of their magnitudes (e.g., Hall [1988], Campbell
and Mankiw [1989], and Attanasio and Weber [1993]). Controversy about parameter val-
ues nevertheless persists, in part due to data limitations. We believe, however, that the
recent literature documenting the drop in average household consumption expenditure at
retirement – the “retirement—consumption puzzle” – suggests a new avenue for progress.
With the goal of enhancing the life—cycle model’s usefulness for current and future policy
research, this paper reconciles the model with empirical evidence on the change in house-
holds’ expenditure at retirement and then uses the magnitude of that change as a novel
and, we argue, advantageous source of identiﬁcation in estimating parameters.
A number of recent papers describe a substantial drop in household expenditures at
retirement.1 Some authors view the sudden change in expenditures as a puzzle. Indeed,
a central prediction of the life—cycle model is that agents should smooth marginal utility
across ages, and, in the simplest formulations of model, this prediction maps into an
optimal life—cycle path of consumption that is itself smooth. When, for example, retirement
is anticipated, and when utility is an additively separable function of consumption and
leisure, consumption should change continuously with age.
However, preferences over consumption and leisure may not take an additively separa-
ble form.2 Furthermore, a number of economists argue that opportunities for market—work
hours are not continuous. We show formally below that a tractable life—cycle speciﬁca-
tion with intratemporal utility that is nonseparable in consumption and leisure, with work
options that are discrete, and with a retirement age that emerges from household choice,
predicts a discontinuous consumption change at retirement.
We then show that if one is willing to treat the change in household consumption at
retirement as a consequence of purposeful behavior, the magnitude of the change provides
1 E.g., Banks et al. [1998], Bernheim et al. [2001], Hurd and Rohwedder [2003], Haider
and Stephens [2004], and Aguiar and Hurst [2004]. The decline estimated in these papers
ranges from 7% to 35%.
2 Indeed Attanasio and Weber [1993] and Meghir and Weber [1996] argue that allowing
for nonseparability is crucial for ﬁtting the data.
3useful information for estimating life—cycle model parameters. Consider the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES). Suppose that consumption and leisure are complements
(i.e., that we have intratemporal nonseparability) and that a household anticipates a dis-
crete increase in leisure upon retiring. In that case, the household will want to change its
consumption abruptly at retirement; moreover, the direction and magnitude of the desired
change will depend on the household’s taste for smoothing utility over time, that is, on its
IES for consumption/leisure services. In particular, if a household’s taste for intertemporal
smoothing is high, it may choose to decrease its consumption at retirement so that lost
utility from consumption oﬀsets gains from additional leisure. If, on the other hand, it has
a lower desire for intertemporal smoothing, a household might increase its consumption
at retirement – to take advantage of the complementarity of consumption and leisure.
The size, and sign, of the consumption change registered in the data can thus help us to
estimate households’ IES.
By oﬀering an alternative method for identifying life—cycle parameters, especially the
IES, this paper contributes to a literature that has formed two basic strands. The ﬁrst
calibrates the life-cycle model from (macro) data and various existing studies (e.g., Auer-
bach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], Cooley and Prescott [1995], and Altig et al. [2001]). This strand
tends to favor a moderate IES for consumption, usually between 0.2 and 1.0. The second
strand of the literature typically identiﬁes the IES for consumption with the coeﬃcient
on the, properly instrumented, rate of return on assets in a consumption Euler equation.
This strand includes analyses of macro data, which sometimes estimate an IES very near
zero (e.g., Hall [1988], Campbell and Mankiw [1989]), and analyses of micro data, which
typically estimate an IES between 0.5 and 0.8 (e.g., Attanasio and Weber [1993] and Banks
et al. [1998]). Our approach can contribute evidence on the robustness of IES estimates
t ov a r i a t i o ni nm e t h o do fe s t i m a t i o na n dd e c i s i o nd o m a i n . 3
Furthermore, our method has the advantage that it estimates the IES from changes
associated with a highly predictable and consequential life event, namely, retirement. The
standard strategy of instrumenting for asset returns in period t+1 using economic variables
k n o w ni np e r i o dt suﬀers from two limitations. First, the relevant variation (anticipated
changes in real rates of return) is modest in size, in practice perfectly correlated across
individuals in a cross section and, therefore, seems unlikely to produce changes in behavior
that are large enough to be precisely estimated from available data. Second, changes in
asset returns are notoriously diﬃcult to predict. As a result, problems of weak instru-
ments arise.4 This paper’s identiﬁcation strategy, in contrast, depends on a phenomenon
3 Other papers have provided alternative methods for estimating and IES parameter.
For example, Barsky et al. [1997] use the responses to hypothetical questions to estimate the
IES. Estimating fully speciﬁed structural models, Rust and Phelan [1997] identify an IES
from the labor supply and Social Security application decisions of older males; and Keane
and Wolpin [2001] identify an IES for services from the decisions of young men concerning
schooling, work and saving. Using aggregate data, Basu and Kimball [2003] implement a
model with nonseparable consumption and leisure and with income and substitution eﬀects
on labor supply that cancel. Their method indicates an IES of 0.5 since the 1980s, but it
is unstable for earlier data from the postwar period.
4 See Yogo [2004] for a thorough discussion. An advantage, nevertheless, of using an-
4that is economically substantial, mostly anticipated, and independently repeated within
cross sections of data. In addition, our method has the advantage that it does not rely on
unmodeled sources of variation. Interpreting rate—of—return estimates may require a spec-
iﬁcation with household decision making under uncertainty, household prediction of the
distribution for future shocks, and even transactions costs – all elements beyond the scope
of many policy—simulation models. Our procedure, on the other hand, straightforwardly
employs a model designed for policy experiments.
Our approach relies on interpreting the change in expenditure at retirement as in-
tentional. Haider and Stephens [2004] test an alternative idea that consumption declines
on average at retirement because retirement is often unexpected. Using subjective predic-
tions about retirement age as an instrument for anticipated retirement, they ﬁnd that the
expenditure decline remains statistically and economically signiﬁcant (though one—third
s m a l l e rt h a nw i t hn o n — I Ve s t i m a t e s ) .I nar e l ated study, Hurd and Rohwedder [2003] use
novel survey questions about expectations and show that households anticipate that their
consumption will dip about 20% at retirement. Similarly, Laitner [2001] points out that
ﬁnancial advisors have long said that retirees should plan for less consumption than work-
ing people: he quotes a TIAA—CREF brochure stating that “you’ll need 60 to 90 percent
of current income in retirement, adjusted for inﬂation, to maintain the lifestyle you now
lead,” and he cites a popular press article writing that “many ﬁnancial planners say it will
take 70 to 80 percent of your current income to maintain your standard of living when
you retire.” These sources suggest that households anticipate a drop in consumption at
retirement and, therefore, that this change is intentional.
We employ two data sets. We use pseudo—panel data from the U.S. Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey 1984-2001 to estimate a consumption-Euler equation. The estimated
coeﬃcients are composites of underlying parameters from a life—cycle model with nonsepa-
rable consumption and leisure.A si np r e v i o u ss t u d i e s ,w eﬁnd a substantial average drop in
household expenditure at retirement. Combining the consumption coeﬃcients, a life—cycle
model, and lifetime earnings proﬁles from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) panel
data, we use an equation measuring the model’s predicted optimal retirement age against
HRS data on retirement to extract estimates of structural parameters. We estimate, quite
precisely, intertemporal elasticity parameter values that are on the higher end of those
found and used in the literature: our IES for services is approximately 0.67, and we es-
timate an IES for consumption of 0.87. We then assess the model’s “out-of-sample” ﬁt
by comparing its prediction of average household wealth at retirement with HRS data on
middle class net worth (data which did not inform the estimation). Despite the inclusion
of a drop in consumption at retirement, our model matches the wealth data remarkably
well.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses several of our key
assumptions. Section 3 presents our model and estimation strategy. Sections 4—5 discuss
our data and present our estimates. Section 6 compares simulations from our model with
HRS data on household net worth. Section 7 concludes.
ticipated changes in asset returns to estimate the IES is that the validity of the estimate
does not depend on a particular functional form for the utility function.
52. Assumptions
In this paper’s model, every household chooses its saving and labor supply to maximize
its utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint. Our analysis assumes that (1) the
work day is indivisible, (2) private—pension formulas do not aﬀect workers’ retirement
age, (3) household preference orderings may be intratemporally nonseparable with respect
consumption and leisure, and (4) perfect markets exist for annuities, health and disability
insurance. Our rationale for assumptions (1)—(3) is as follows.
Assumption 1: The work day is indivisible.
Households in our analysis must either work full time or retire. While in practice
employers do oﬀe rp a r t — t i m ej o b s ,t h er a t eo fp a yi s ,o n average, substantially lower than
that for full—time work.5 As Rust and Phelan [1997, p.786] write,
The ﬁnding that most workers make discontinuous transitions from full—
time work to not working, and the ﬁnding that the majority of the relatively
small number of ‘gradual retirees’ reduce their annual hours of work by taking on
a sequence of lower wage partial retirement ‘bridge jobs’ rather than gradually
reducing hours of work at their full-time pre-retirement ‘career job’ suggests the
existence of explicit or implicit constraints on the individual’s choice of hours of
work.
An indivisibility assumption is also consistent with the fact that U.S. data show little trend
in male work hours or participation rates after 1940, except for a trend toward earlier
retirement 1940-80 (e.g., Pencavel [1986], Blundell and MaCurdy [1999], and Burkhauser
et al. [1999]).
Assumption 2: Pension formulas do not aﬀect retirement ages.
Although some analyses stress the importance of workers’ private pension plans as
determinants of retirement behavior (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier [1986], Stock and
Wise [1990]), we assume that a worker chooses an employer whose pension plan matches
his requirements; thus, in this paper, private pensions form a part of private wealth accu-
mulation and do not require separate attention. Arguments in favor of explicitly modeling
the distinct features of private pensions seem most applicable to deﬁned beneﬁtp l a n s ;
however, in practice deﬁned contribution plans have become more important. Even in the
past, many of the features of deﬁned beneﬁt plans originated at union initiative or during
collective bargaining, and thus presumably reﬂected worker preferences.
Assumption 3: Utility is intratemporally nonseparable in consumption and leisure.
Although, for the sake of simplicity, this paper’s analysis assumes household preference
orderings are intertemporally separable, it makes consumption and leisure intratemporally
nonseparable. Since intratemporal nonseparability is central to this paper’s focus, we
examine its implications in detail.
5 Reasons for the wage penalty for part-time work include daily ﬁxed costs of startup
and shutdown, scheduling and coordination problems, employer concern for timely re-
turn on training investments, and the ﬁxed—cost nature of some employee beneﬁts (e.g.,
Hurd [1996]).
6To see the restrictions imposed by intratemporal separability, consider a speciﬁce x -
ample. A single—person household lives from t =0t ot = T,c h o o s i n gt or e t i r ea tt = R.
The household’s time endowment at each age is 1; when the household works, its leisure
falls to ¯   ∈ (0,1). According to assumption (1), indivisibilities force ¯   to be a ﬁxed pa-
rameter. The wage is w; the interest rate is r. A household’s consumption ct yields utility







subject to:  t =
F
¯  , for t<R
1, for t ≥ R
˙ at = r · at +( 1−  t) · w − ct ,
a0 =0=aT .
As utility depends on the sum u(c)+v( ), this is the separable case.
Provided u(.)i sc o n c a v e ,s p e c i ﬁcation (1) predicts that, even with a discrete increase
in leisure at retirement, there should be no abrupt change in consumption at that time.
To see this note that, along an optimal consumption path, the additi o n a lu t i l i t ya td a t e
s from one extra dollar’s consumption, u (cs), must equal the additional utility from the
dollar if it were saved until later date t, by which time it will have grown to an amount
er·(t−s).T h a ti s ,
u (cs)=er·(t−s) · u (ct), (2)
the so—called “Euler equation” for consumption. Letting ct− be consumption the instant
before t,a n dct+ the instant after, condition (2) yields
u (ct−)=u (ct+). (3)
With u (.) continuous, equation (3) is inconsistent with a jump in consumption at any age,
including at the age of retirement.
While intratemporal additivity is the most common speciﬁcation for utility in the
life—cycle literature, a number of authors instead assume nonseparable preferences. A
well—known example is Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987].6 We can easily modify example (1)
to accommodate their alternative. Let a household have a constant returns to scale “neo-
classical” production function f : R2  → R1 that combines current consumption and leisure
to generate a ﬂow of services, the latter yielding a ﬂow of utility, say, u(f). The ﬁrst line
of (1) changes to










though constraints can remain the same. Because a bivariate constant—returns—to—scale
neoclassical production function has f12(.) > 0, inputs are complementary in the sense
that more leisure (consumption) raises the marginal product of consumption (leisure).
If u(.) were linear, this complementarity would make the household want to increase its
consumption at (and after) retirement to take advantage of the increased marginal utility
of consumption that derives from higher leisure. If, on the other hand, u(.)i ss u ﬃciently
concave, the household would strongly desire a smooth ﬂow of services at diﬀerent ages;
hence, it would plan more consumption prior to t = R to counterbalance its abundant
service ﬂow from leisure later. In the end, with nonseparability, rational behavior may
lead to an age proﬁle of consumption which discontinuously changes in either direction at
retirement.
As p e c i ﬁc parameterization with nonseparable consumption and leisure makes clear
the connection between the change in consumption at retirement and the structural pa-
rameters of the life—cycle model, and it will form the framework for our empirical analysis
later. Let the intratemporal household production function f(.) be Cobb—Douglas:
f(c, )=[ c]α · [ ]1−α, α ∈ (0,1).




, γ < 1.
Recalling that   changes from ¯   ∈ [0,1) to 1 at retirement, condition (3) at retirement date
t = R is
([cR−]α · [¯  ]1−α)γ−1 · α · [cR−]α−1 · [¯  ]1−α =( [ cR+]α)γ−1 · α · [cR+]α−1 ⇐⇒
[cR−]α·γ−1 · [¯  ](1−α)·γ =[ cR+]α·γ−1 ⇐⇒
[cR−] · [¯  ]
−
γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ =[ cR+]. (5)
Equation (5) shows that the change in consumption at retirement provides useful
information for estimating the parameter γ, which determines the IES. Speciﬁcally, given
α and ¯  , the change in consumption at retirement pins down γ. It is straightforward to
show that the change in consumption at retirement is strictly increasing in γ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
if γ is nearly 1, u(.) is nearly linear; and we have noted that in this case consumption jumps
up at retirement. More generally, whenever 0 < γ, consumption discontinuously rises at
retirement:
cR− <c R+ if [¯  ]
−
γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ > 1 ⇐⇒ −
γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
< 0 ⇐⇒ γ > 0.
On the other hand, the preceding algebra indicates that
8cR− >c R+ ⇐⇒ γ < 0.
Thus, whenever γ < 0, the model predicts a discontinuous drop in consumption at retire-
ment and, because (cR+ − cR−) is increasing in γ, the decline in consumption at retirement
grows larger as the taste for intertemporal smoothing increases (γ decreases).
To summarize, our analysis illustrates that an abrupt adjustment in consumption
at retirement is consistent with rational behavior. Equation (5) also shows that data
o nt h es i z eo fc h a n g ei nc o n s u m p t i o nc a nh e l pu s to identify the taste for intertemporal
substitution. We now turn to this task of estimation.
3. Model
This section presents the model that is the basis for our empirical analysis. We ﬁrst
elaborate the framework above to facilitate comparisons with data as follows: we allow for
changes in household size and composition that may inﬂuence households’ preferences for
consumption; and, we consider the possible role of liquidity constraints. Then we lay out
our estimation strategy.
Equivalent Adults. To confront data, we take into account the fact that households gain
and lose members over their life spans, and presumably desire greater consumption at ages
when their membership is larger.
Following Tobin [1967], let the number of “equivalent adults” per household of age t
be nt.L e tnt satisfy
nt =1+ξS · nS
t + ξC · nC
t , (6)
where the household’s head constitutes one equivalent adult, nS
t is 1 if there is a spouse
and 0 otherwise, nC
t is the number of children in the household, and ξS and ξC are equiv-
alency weights (relative to the head’s weight of 1). If a household’s age—t expenditure on









The idea is that households internally allocate their lifetime resources “fairly.” To un-
derstand the outcome, consider a household facing interest and subjective discount rates
of zero and suppose that  s =  t. Then in our framework, the household would want to





























9In other words, if the household consists of the head alone at s, ﬁve members at t,a n dt h e
latter constitute two equivalent adults, the household will allocate twice as much budget
for consumption at t as at s. If there are scale economies to household operation or public
goods that household members can share, the weights on spouse and children will be less
than 1. The smaller are ξS and ξC, the larger the advantages of scale. We will estimate
ξS and ξC.
Liquidity Constraints. A large literature studies the potential eﬀects of liquidity con-
straints on life—cycle saving (e.g., Mariger [1987], Zeldes [1989], Hubbard and Judd [1986]).
To analyze actual behavior, we separately consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, ﬁnancial markets
are unwilling to extend loans without collateral; thus, if at is household net worth at age
t, we incorporate into our model a constraint
at ≥ 0a l lt. (8)
In the second case, we allow at take any value (provided only that a0 = aT =0 ) . F o r
example, it is conceivable that unsecured credit—card debt has, at least in the last several
decades, enabled U.S. households to carry negative net worth balances. Or, inter vivos
transfers from parents to their grown children might largely eliminate the eﬀects of liquidity
constraints.
Model. The life—cycle maximization model upon which we base our empirical analysis is













subject to:  it =
F
¯  , for t<R i
1, for t ≥ Ri
˙ ait = r · ait +( 1−  it) · eit · w · (1 − τ − τss)+ssbit · (1 − τ/2) − cit ,
ait ≥ 0a l lt,
ai0 =0=aiT ,
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, and equivalent adults, nit, come from (6). House-
hold i supplies eit “eﬀective hours” in the labor market per hour of work time; hence, if w
is the economy wide average wage rate, the household earns eis·w per hour of market work
at age s. Earnings include both the wages of the head and those of the spouse, if present
and working in the labor market. We assume a proportional income tax τ on earnings,
interest, and one half of Social Security beneﬁts, ssbit. The real interest rate r is given
in net—of—tax terms. There is also a proportional Social Security tax τss.A s a b o v e , w e
take f(.) to be Cobb—Douglas and u(.) to be isoelastic. In our ﬁrst case, we incorporate
liquidity constraint (8), as shown. In a second case, we analyze (9) omitting the constraint
ait ≥ 0a l lt.
10T h ei s o e l a s t i cu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nu(.) is standard. Our Cobb—Douglas speciﬁcation for
f(.) has a number of advantages over a more general CES function that is sometimes used
in the literature: it does not imply secular trends in the average retirement age due to
technological progress; it is consistent with our aggregative approach in the sense that it
does not lead households of diﬀerent earning ability (i.e., diﬀerent eit i n( 9 )a tt h es a m ea g e
t)t ob e h a v ed i ﬀerently; and, it allows exact identiﬁcation below without disaggregative
d a t a ,t i m es e r i e sv a r i a t i o ni nt a xr a t e s ,e t c .
Identiﬁcation. This paper estimates two equations based on model (9). The ﬁrst is the
Euler equation from utility maximization with respect to consumption; the second stems
from utility maximization with respect to retirement age. The parameters of ultimate
interest form a vector
θ ≡ (α,γ,ρ,ξS,ξC).
With both estimating equations together, the elements of θ are exactly identiﬁed.
Euler equation. Suppose for a given retirement age Ri that we solve (9) for the utility—
maximizing life—cycle time path of consumption. We then face a concave maximization
problem with a convex constraint set. Liquidity constraint (8) introduces complications,
but Mariger [1986] provides an algorithm. The algorithm divides a lifetime [0,T]i n t oa
sequence of closed intervals Ii. On alternate intervals either the liquidity constraint binds,
in which case ct equals the household’s current resource inﬂow, or the constraint does not
bind, in which case the Euler equation, described next, holds. In practice, in every case
that we consider, the algorithm ﬁnds at most two intervals. In the last, the Euler equation
holds; if there are two, the liquidity constraint binds in the ﬁrst. For simplicity, henceforth
our exposition assumes two intervals, [0,S]a n d[ S,T], with S<R i.
Consider s ∈ [S,Ri). The arguments of Section 2 imply
∂ niS · u
D
f( ciS




∂ nis · u
D
f( cis














cis = ψiS · e
(r−ρ)·(s−S)
1−α·γ · nis with ψiS ≡ ciS/niS .






1−α·γ ·(s−S) · nis , if S ≤ s<R i,
ψiS · e
r−ρ
1−α·γ ·(s−S) · nis · [¯  ]
−γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ , if s ≥ Ri.
(10)
Integrating the budget constraints of (9), setting
11cis =( 1− ¯  ) · eis · w · (1 − τ − τss)




e−r·t · (1 − ¯  ) · eit · w · (1 − τ − τss)dt +
8 T
Ri










1−α·γ ·t · nit dt +
8 T
Ri




1−α·γ ·t · nit dt
o
.
Thus, ψiS reﬂects a household’s entire life course – including its earning ability, number
of children, and retirement age.
Our empirical speciﬁcation takes logarithms of both sides of (10) and appends a term
νis to the right side to reﬂect consumption measurement errors. From (6),
ln(nis) ≈ ξS · nS
is + ξC · nC
is .
Writing (10) at s ≥ S and again at s + 1, taking logs, and diﬀerencing, we have
ln(ci,s+1) − ln(cis)=
r − ρ
1 − α · γ





γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
· ln(¯  ) · [χs+1(Ri) − χs(Ri)] + νi,s+1 − νis , (11)
w h e r ew eu s et h ei n d i c a t o rf u n c t i o n
χs(R) ≡
F
0, if s<R ,
1, if s ≥ R.
Diﬀerencing eliminates ψiS from (11). Removing the inﬂuence of, among other things,
varying earning abilities, is extremely convenient in practice – our Health and Retire-
ment Study data provide lifetime earning records for only one cohort of households, and,
although we have Consumer Expenditure Survey consumption data for many cohorts, the
latter data’s overlap with the cohort having complete earning information is short. Sec-
tion 4 estimates (11) as a linear regression equation.
Optimal retirement age. The four coeﬃcients of diﬀerence equation (11) are composites
of the ﬁve structural parameters of the underlying model: letting the vector β denote the
coeﬃcients of (11), we have
β ≡ (β1,β2,β3,β4) ≡ (
r − ρ
1 − α · γ
, ξS , ξC , −
γ · (1 − α) · ln(¯  )
1 − α · γ
). (12)
Even if we have estimated β, we need one more condition to identify α, γ,a n dρ separately.
To complete our identiﬁcation, we turn to a second equation stemming from maximization
of (9) with respect to retirement age Ri.
12For any parameter vector θ, one can solve model (9) for a household’s optimal retire-
ment age. After maximizing (9) with respect to consumption – our Euler—equation step
above – call the criterion V (Ri). Our next step chooses the R which maximizes V (R).
Although V (.) may not be concave, our numerical calculation maximizes V (R)b yt r y i n g
every monthly retirement age from 0 to T.7 Denote the optimal retirement age as g(θ).
Given our functional forms, even if households have diﬀerent wage rates, reﬂecting diﬀerent
inherent earning abilities, their desired retirement ages are the same. Preferred retirement
ages could, nevertheless, diﬀer in practice because households anticipate diﬀerences in
longevity due to heredity; households have diﬀering numbers of children; occupations dif-
fer in their physical and emotional stress, leading to occupational diﬀerences in eit at
advanced ages; households have diﬀerent health status; households have diﬀering tastes
for leisure; etc. To model possible variations in preferences, health, and demography, we
could modify the lifetime utility function of (9) to
8 T
0











where ϕi is positive (negative) if household i has an unusually strong (weak) induced
preference for leisure. The optimal retirement age is then
Ri = g(θ)+ηi , (13)
where Ri is the household’s actual retirement age, and ηi is a random error reﬂecting
deviations from average in ϕi.
Estimating the Structural Parameters Suppose our Euler equation generates an estimate
ˆ β of vector β.W ec a l i b r a t e¯   below. Letting x ≡− β4/ln(¯  ), the fourth term of (12) yields
x =
γ − α · γ
1 − α · γ
⇐⇒ γ =
x
(x − 1) · α +1
. (14)
If we knew α, (14) would determine γ. Subsequently, the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( 1 2 )w o u l dp i nd o w n
ρ.
O u rs t r a t e g yi sa sf o l l o w s .W ee s t i m a t eˆ β from consumption Euler equation (11). Then
expression (14) shows that θ = θ(α, ˆ β). Combining the latter with (13), we estimate α





+ ηi . (15)
Fortunately, one can expect to be able to match any retirement age Ri with an α ∈ [0,1].
For example, if α = 0, leisure but not consumption yields utility; so, households would
choose never to work at all. If α = 1, on the other hand, consumption but not leisure
yields utility; so, householdsw o u l dc h o o s en e v e rt or e t i r e .
7 H a v i n gf o u n dt h eb e s tm o n t hi nad i s c r e t ec h oice space, for increased computational
accuracy we then solve the ﬁrst—order condition V  (R) = 0 – for the local maximum. A
derivation of the ﬁrst—order condition is available from the authors on request.
134. Consumption
We estimate the parameter composites of expression (12) from a GLS linear regression
on equation (11). This section describes our data and results.
CEX Data. The primary data source for this section is the U.S. Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX). It is the most comprehensive source of disaggregate consumption data for
the U.S. The CEX obtains diary information on small purchases from one set of house-
holds; for a second set of households, it conducts quarterly interviews that catalog major
purchases. The survey also collects demographic data and data on value of the respon-
dent’s house. At any given time, the sample consists of approximately 5,000 (7,000 after
1999) households each of which remains in the survey for at most 5 quarters. The survey
was conducted at multi—year intervals prior to 1984, and annually thereafter. This paper
uses the CEX surveys from 1984-2001.8
Table 1 compares National Income and Product Account (NIPA) personal consump-
tion for 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 with weighted totals from the CEX.9 We exclude
household expenditures on pensions and life insurance from the CEX: the former consti-
tute saving, and our concept of earnings is net of insurance. Looking at the last row of
Table 1, total consumption measured in the CEX is only about 50-70 percent as large as
the NIPA equivalent, with the discrepancy higher in later years.10 This paper assumes that
the NIPA numbers are accurate; that item—nonresponse and other measurement errors of
the survey typically make CEX totals too low; and, that the relative magnitude of survey
errors does not systematically vary with age. Thus, for each year we scale CEX consump-
tion categories, uniformly across ages, to match NIPA amounts. Appendix I describes in
detail three additional adjustments concerning the treatment of housing services, health
care, and personal business expenditures.
Deﬂating with the NIPA personal consumption deﬂator, we derive an adjusted con-
sumption amount for each age i and year t. T h i si so u rm e a s u r eo fcit.D u e t o t h e
construction of the CEX from separate interview and diary surveys, we do not have con-
sumption ﬁgures for individual households; however, we can form a pseudo panel of average
household consumption for each age and year. The number of interviewed households per
cell that we use below varies from 127 to 981. The left—hand side variable for our Euler
equation is
∆ln(cit) ≡ ln(ci+1,t+1) − ln(cit).
8 The web site http://stats.bls.gov.gov/csxhome.htm presents aggregative tables, code-
books, etc., for the CEX. This paper uses raw CEX data from the ICPSR archive, and
we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the BLS in providing stub ﬁles of changing
category deﬁnitions.
9 We abstract from the empirical diﬀerence between consumption and expenditure (e.g.,
Aguiar and Hurst [2004]). Except in the case of housing, this paper draws no distinction
between consumer durable stocks and ﬂows.
10 There is a particularly large gap for “apparel” in 1985. The 1984 and 1985 data
ﬁles omit a number of apparel subcategories. We assume this does not create biases with
respect to age – so that our scaling procedure below is suﬃcient to eliminate the problem.
14Table 1. Consumer Expenditure Amount ÷ NIPA Amount
(percent)a
Category 1985 1990 1995 2000
food 73.5 69.6 64.9 62.3
apparel 22.0 60.0 55.4 49.5
personal care 73.7 65.8 61.7 70.2
shelter: 82.9 82.4 81.4 81.0
own home 74.1 69.7 73.0 71.4
other 102.1 112.2 102.5 107.6
household operation 76.0 82.6 78.6 71.4
transportation 111.7 109.0 110.7 105.4
medical care 27.6 23.2 20.1 19.3
recreation 61.8 55.5 50.9 45.0
education 65.1 61.2 58.8 57.4
personal business: 14.8 12.2 9.9 6.8
brokerage fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other 48.5 37.5 33.0 23.4
miscellaneous 120.0 80.0 68.0 67.5
total 66.7 64.3 59.7 56.0
a. Source: http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/AllTables.asp,
Section 2, Table 2.4.
We organize the data so that a household’s age is the age of the wife for a married couple,
and the age of the single house h o l dh e a di no t h e rc a s e s .
The CEX provides information on whether the household is married. The latter
provides our regressor nS ∈ {0, 1}. Although the CEX also reports number of children
ages 0-17, we are interested in the consumption of older children; hence, we construct our
own measure of children per household as follows. Using Census data on births per woman
at age i, i ∈ {15,...,49},i ny e a rt ∈ {1920,...,2001}, we simulate the number of children
of each age for women of separate ages i in 1984,...,2001.11 As stated, our data set assigns
household observations to each age cell according to the age of the adult woman for all
11 The natality statistics for 1920-40 come from
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/vsus/1963/1963.htm,
Vital Statistical Rates In The U.S. 1900-1940. Statistics for 1940-1999 come from
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/unpubd/natality/natab99.htm,
Table 1-7: Total Fertility Rates and Birth Rates, By Age of Mother and Race: US, 1940-99.
Data for 1999-2001 come from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm.
15but single male households. We append numbe r so fc h i l d r e nt oe a c hc e l lo nt h eb a s i so f
the ages and birth dates of women.
Similarly, the CEX survey questions on retirement are not ideal for our purposes.
The CEX interview questionnaire (e.g., http://stats.bls.gov/cex/csxce30201.pdf) only asks
whether the respondent is “retired” if he or she had zero weeks of work in the last twelve
months; therefore, we turn to the March Current Population Survey 1984-2001 for our
χs(Ri)v a r i a b l e . 12 , 13 We consider a household retired if the head is at least 50 years old
and answers that he or she is out of the labor force at the time of the March survey. For
male-female couples, the household is retired for our purposes if the male is at least 50 and
out of the labor market (in the March survey). We focus on male behavior because males
were more attached to the labor force in the cohorts of our data that reach retirement age,
and because our analysis abstracts from a detailed model of decision making within dual
earner households and home—work/market—work choices.
Regression Results. Tables 2-3 present regression results for (11). We use households of
age 20-80 for 1984-2001, so that our diﬀerences ∆ln(cit) cover ages 20-79 and years 1984-
2000. Each regression includes separate time dummies for 1984, 1985,..., 1999. The other
independent variables are a constant; presence of a spouse, nS; retirement status, χ(R);
and, number of children 0-22, nC.
Table 2 provides our estimates of β =( β1,...,β4). The ﬁrst column includes households
as young as 20, but we worry that liquidity constraints may bind at the early ages. When
constraints bind, household consumption grows at the same rate as earnings – and faster
than the Euler equation dictates. Columns 2-4 successively exclude ages under 25, 30, and
35. The estimates in columns 2-4 diﬀer substantially from those of column 1 but not from
one another.
Table 3 considers liquidity constraints more systematically. It incorporates all age
groups, but it includes separate dummy variables for ages 20-34. If liquidity constraints
bind in practice at a given age, we expect the corresponding dummy variable to have a
positive coeﬃcient. The ﬁrst dummy—variable coeﬃcients are indeed large and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero; however, the eﬀect seems to run its course by age 25.
In the end, we restrict our attention to Euler—equation estimates from columns 2-4 of
Table 2. If liquidity constraints are not important in practice, using only columns 2-4 sac-
riﬁces some valid data; however, if constraints do bind for households but we nevertheless
use column 1, our estimates will be inconsistent.
Consider the third column of Table 2. The constant implies an average lifetime growth
rate for per capita consumption of 2.6%/yr. That suggests that between, say, ages 25 and
62, in the absence of retirement a household’s consumption per equivalent adult would
rise by a factor of 2.62. In Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], for instance, the corresponding
factor is about 1.54; in Gokhale et al. [2001], it is 1.74; in Tobin [1967], it is 13.33. For
12 These data were downloaded using the University of Michigan’s Population Studies
Center CPS extract utility: http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dads/inhouse/extract.html.
13 The average median retirement age 1984-2001i nt h eC E Xd a t ai s6 4 - 6 5 ,w h e r e a si ti s
about 62 in the Current Population Survey over the same period. See also our HRS results
in Section 5 below.
16Table 2. Estimated Coeﬃcients for Consumption Euler Equation:
Consumer Expenditure Survey Data 1984-2000a
Consumer Expenditure Survey Sample Ages:b
Parameter
Age Age Age Age
20-79 25-79 30-79 35-79
Constant 0.0275 0.0259 0.0261 0.0249
(S.E.) ( 0.0009) ( 0.0010) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0018)
TS t a t . 30.2060 27.1764 21.2747 14.0274
Spouse 0.6112 0.4351 0.4441 0.4336
S.E. ( 0.0397) ( 0.0460) ( 0.0528) ( 0.0606)
TS t a t . 15.3805 9.4498 8.4139 7.1553
Retired -0.1283 -0.1595 -0.1602 -0.1387
S.E. ( 0.0325) ( 0.0313) ( 0.0332) ( 0.0390)
TS t a t . -3.9499 -5.0914 -4.8198 -3.5529
Child 0-22 0.1452 0.1346 0.1370 0.1290
S.E. ( 0.0074) ( 0.0078) ( 0.0103) ( 0.0139)
TS t a t . 19.4908 17.2704 13.3255 9.2761
Summary Statistics
R2 9.8010 8.2234 7.1227 7.4512
Observations 1020 935 850 765
Mean Sq Error 0.0086 0.0082 0.0087 0.0091
a. Year dummies 1984, 1985, ... , 1999 not reported.
b. For couples, age of adult female – see text.
an inﬁnite—lived representative agent model (e.g., Cooley and Prescott [1995]), the growth
rate of consumption in a steady—state equilibrium would, of course, match the growth rate
of GDP.
We estimate that the addition of a spouse raises household consumption by 44 percent.
This closely agrees with the U.S. Social Security System’s award of 50 percent extra beneﬁts
for a spouse. Our estimate implies substantial returns to scale for larger households. Many
papers in the literature set ξS =1 .0, and Table 2 suggests that such a calibration may be
misleading.
C o l u m n3e s t i m a t e sa1 6p e r c e n td r o pi nc o n s umption at retirement. This is consistent
with, though at the smaller end of, estimates in Bernheim et al. [2001], Banks et al. [1998],
and Hurd and Rohwedder [2003] and the retirement brochures cited in Laitner [2001].14
14 Earlier drafts of this paper with less disaggregate treatment of medical expenditures
17Table 3. Speciﬁcation Analysis: Consumption Euler
Equation, CEX Data Years 1984-2000 and Female
Ages 20-79, Dummy Variable each Age 20-34a
Parameter Coeﬃcient TS t a t




Child 0-22 0.1265 9.8395
New Dummy Variables for Female Ages 20-34
Age 20 0.0638 2.6621
Age 21 0.1149 4.7912
Age 22 0.0419 1.7620
Age 23 -0.0083 -0.3461
Age 24 0.0299 1.2659
Age 25 -0.0122 -0.5139
Age 26 -0.0086 -0.3660
Age 27 0.0090 0.3806
Age 28 -0.0070 -0.2963
Age 29 0.0014 0.0580
Age 30 0.0126 0.5383
Age 31 -0.0172 -0.7328
Age 32 -0.0042 -0.1800
Age 33 0.0343 1.4619
Age 34 -0.0070 -0.3655
a. Year dummies 1984, 1985, ... , 1999 not reported.
While our estimate of the decline in expenditure at retirement is relatively mod-
est, it may still represent an overestimate if the timing of retirement is, to some extent,
unanticipated and disproportionately driven by shocks that decrease lifetime income. Our
certainty equivalent model assumes that the relevant risk is fully insured and therefore
does not aﬀect the shape of the age—consumption proﬁle. In reality, however, there may be
uninsured shocks. Unanticipated retirements driven by positive shocks to health or asset
returns, and therefore lifetime income, would likely be associated with discrete increases
(recall Appendix I) implied declines of 20 percent or more, but we believe that our current
speciﬁcation is more accurate.
18in consumption. These cases would tend to bias our estimate of the anticipated change in
consumption at retirement upwards. Conversely, retirements driven by negative, uninsured
shocks would likely be associated with discrete decreases in consumption. To the extent
that retirement is unanticipated, and disproportionately driven by shocks that lower ex-
pected lifetime income, our estimates would overstate the degree to which the decline in
consumption at retirement derives from the nonseparability of consumption and leisure.
The non—zero coeﬃcient and large t statistic on “Retired” in Table 3 reject intratem-
poral additive separability of consumption and leisure – and Section 2 shows that the
rejection does not heavily depend upon the form of our production function.
Table 3’s fourth row indicates an increase in household consumption of 14 percent
for each child age 0-22. Since two parents cor r e s p o n dt o1 . 4 4“ e q u i v a l e n ta d u l t s , ”ac h i l d
adds about 20 percent as much as each parent. Mariger [1986] estimates that children
consume 30 percent as much as adults; Attanasio and Browning [1995, p. 1122] suggest
58 percent; Gokhale et al. [2001] assume 40 percent; most of the analysis in Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ [1987] implicitly weights children at zero; Tobin [1967] assumes teens consume
80 percent as much as adults, and minor children 60 percent.
One would expect that estimating the coeﬃcient for children would be diﬃcult. Al-
though the date at which a child enters a household is precise, in practice diﬀerent children
l e a v eh o m ea td i ﬀerent ages. Unfortunately, liquidity constraints may bind exactly when
many children are born (recall that our Euler equation only perceives changes in numbers
of children). Nevertheless, our estimated coeﬃcients on “Child 0-22” have small standard
errors and large t statistics. Our treatment does not, of course, measure reductions in
parental market work hours due to children. Although this omission surely aﬀects one’s
interpretation of our coeﬃcients, Section 5’s earning proﬁles do reﬂect women’s actual la-
bor force participation and hours – so this margin of choice enters our analysis in another
way. It may be true as well that parents spend a great deal on children but simultaneously
reduce expenditures on themselves, vicariously enjoying their children’s consumption. The
latter would not invalidate our analysis, but it might, again, suggest a diﬀerent interpre-
tation of the “cost” of children.
One might worry that economywide shocks could aﬀect both general retirement be-
havior and consumption. Our regressions include year dummies – and they have little
eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of primary interest. Because macroeconomic shocks conceivably
aﬀect consumption diﬀerently at diﬀerent ages, we also perform GLS on a version of (11)
in which we average every variable at each age over all years. Although the t statistics
drop because the number of degrees of freedom falls almost 95 percent, the coeﬃcient esti-
mates reconﬁrm Table 2: for ages 20-79, the new coeﬃcient estimates are, for the constant,
spouse, retired, and child variables, respectively, 0.0276, 0.8398, -0.0698, 0.1367; for ages
25-79, they are 0.0258, 0.4481, -0.1625, 0.1332; for ages 30-79, they are 0.0253, 0.4318,
-0.1589, 0.1298; and, for ages 35-79, they are 0.0230, 0.3025, -0.1507, 0.1137.
5. Retirement
We employ equation (15) to complete the estimation our model’s structural param-
eters. To determine the utility—maximizing retirement age for (15) from our model, we
need to specify earnings proﬁles, taxes, and interest rates; for the dependent variable of
19a regression of (15), we need empirical retirement ages. For both earning proﬁles and
empirical retirement ages, this section turns to our second major data source, the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS).
Life Cycle Details. We assume a constant gross—of—income tax real interest rate of
5%/yr.15 , 16
We disregard government transfer payments besides Social Security. Our income tax
rate τ comes from government spending on goods and services less indirect taxes (already
removed from proﬁts, and implicitly absent from wages and salaries below). Dividing by
national income, the average over 1952—2003 is 14.28%/year.17
We assume a payroll tax of 15.3% per year. One—half of Social Security beneﬁts are
subject to the income tax. In the calculations below, the Social Security beneﬁtf o r m u l a ,
including the ceiling on taxable annual earnings, follows the history of the U.S. system.
We assume that adults work 40 hours per week until retirement and 0 hours per week
after retirement. With 16 × 7 waking hours per week, we set18
¯   =
16 × 7 − 40
16 × 7
= .6429.
Our retirement—age calculation uses a representative household consisting of a hus-
band, wife, and two children. The wife reaches age 65 in the year 2000; the husband is 2
years older; the husband starts work at age 22 and marries at 24, with the latter being the
time at which the household begins; both children are born two years after the marriage;
and, both children leave home at age 22.19 Following U.S. mortality tables, the husband
15 We calibrate our real interest rate from a ratio of factor payments to capital over the
market value of private net worth. For the numerator, NIPA Table 1.13 gives corporate
business income, indirect taxes, and total labor compensation. The ﬁrst less the other
two is our measure of corporate proﬁts (net of depreciation); the ratio of proﬁts to proﬁts
plus labor remuneration is “proﬁts share.” We multiply the latter times corporate and
noncorporate business income plus nonproﬁt—institution income, less indirect taxes. We
add the income of the household sector (see NIPA Table 1.13) less indirect taxes and
labor remumeration. Finally, we reduce the numerator by personal business expenses
(brokerage fees, etc. from NIPA Table 2.5.5, rows 61—64). The denominator is U.S. Flow
of Funds household and private non—proﬁt institution net worth (Table B.100, row 19),
less government liabilities (Table L106c, row 20). We average the the net sum at the
beginning and end of each given year. The average ratio 1952—2003 of the numerator to
the denominator is .0504.
16 For comparison, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987] use 6.7%/year, Altig et al. [2001]
8.3%/yr., and Cooley and Prescott [1995] 7.2%/yr. Gokhale et al. [2001] use post—tax
rates of 4%/yr. and 6%/yr.
17 Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], for example, use 15%/year.
18 See also Cooley and Prescott [1995] – who, on the basis of time—use studies, determine
that households devote 1/3 of waking hours to work.
19 Notice that assuming two children per household produces a rough match with recent,
slow U.S. population growth.
20dies at the end of age 74; the wife dies at the end of age 80. All of our calculations use
2000 dollars; our price index is the NIPA consumption deﬂator.
We derive earnings proﬁles and retirement ages from the original HRS survey cohort,
consisting of households in which the respondent is age 51-61 in 1992. A majority of par-
ticipant households signed a permission waiver allowing the HRS to link to their Social
Security Administration (SSA) earnings history. Each history runs 1951-1991; the HRS
itself covers 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. In this paper, we use the HRS and
linked SSA records. For men, we estimate a so—called earnings dynamics model regressing
log earnings on a quadratic in age and dummy variables for time. Our regression error has
an individual eﬀect as well as a random term. The data is right censored at the Social
Security tax cap prior to 1980 and the Medicare tax cap 1980-1991, and our likelihood
function takes this into account. Assuming full—time work until retirement (and no work
thereafter), we predict an average earnings proﬁle for a man who reaches 65 in 1998. Ta-
ble A1, Appendix II, presents predicted annual earnings. For women, we use the same type
of statistical model to predict earnings above the censoring limit. To allow for women’s
part—time work and absence at some ages from the labor force, we compute average earn-
ings in all other cases from the actual data. We then use the regression time dummies to
deduce an average earnings proﬁle for women who reach 65 in 2000. Again, see Table A1.
Finally, since HRS earnings are net of employer beneﬁts (including health insurance, pen-
sion contributions, and employer Social Security tax), we multiply household earnings for
each year by the ratio of NIPA total compensation to NIPA wages and salaries.
We derive Social Security beneﬁts after retirement from the statutory beneﬁtf o r m u l a
for 2000. Table A1, Appendix II, shows household beneﬁts if the male retires at age 62
and his wife retires simultaneously, at age 60. Given our treatment of consumption, we
must also incorporate a stream of Medicare beneﬁts after age 65, less participant SMI
cost. To do this, for each adult 65 and older, we add to household resources Medicare
beneﬁts equaling the SMI annual premium for 2000 (i.e., $546) multiplied by the ratio of
HI and SMI total expenditures to SMI premiums for 2000 (i.e., 10.7282, less 1). Again,
see Table A1.
Mean retirement age. We use the HRS as our source for empirical retirement ages; and,
for reasons described above we focus on male retirement. Measuring the empirical average
(male) age of retirement for this cohort is not entirely straightforward because the retire-
ment date of many respondents is not observed. Even in the 2002 wave of the HRS, not
all men have retired, and many men die or leave the survey before retiring. It follows that
an average of the retirement ages among only those observed to have retired will yield a
biased estimate of the population mean.
We use a censored regression to extract an unbiased estimate. Of the 6214 men who
appear in one or more waves of the HRS, 727 retire before age 50 or provide insuﬃcient
information for our analysis. Excluding these, the sample is 5487. Among the latter, 3661
retire by the last available HRS wave, 2002. Their mean retirement age is 60.25. The
remaining 1826 men either (i) died before retiring, (ii) left the survey before retiring, or
(iii) continued to work as of the last interview in 2002. Our analysis treats the 1826 men
as right—censored at their age of death or last interview. The regression equation is
21Ri = µ + ηi , (16)
with dependent variable and error as in (15). Table 4 presents our estimate of the average
retirement age, ˆ µ =6 2 .57.
Table 4. Censored—Regression Output:
Average Age of Retirement for HRS Males
Variable Value Std. Err. T—Stat







Structural Parameter Estimates. Although the preceding discussion might seem to sug-
gest that we need to estimate (15) using a Tobit likelihood function, we can achieve exactly
the same outcome with a two—step procedure as follows: estimate ˆ µ from (16); then solve
for the alpha, ˆ α,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes





Our estimate of theta is ˆ θ = θ(ˆ α, ˆ β). The so—called delta method – which uses the
estimated covariance matrix for ˆ β and the estimated variance for ˆ µ – yields an estimate
o ft h ea s y m p t o t i cc o v a r i a n c em a t r i xf o rˆ θ.
Table 5 presents our estimates of the structural parameters, with and without liquidity
constraint (8). The estimates of gamma vary from -.49 to -.58; the estimates of alpha vary
from .27 to .28. These correspond to estimates of an IES for services, 1/(1−γ), of 0.63 to
0.67 and an IES for consumption itself, 1/(1−α·γ), of 0.86 to 0.88. The estimates of the
subjective time discount rate, ρ, fall between .0117 and .0139. All are statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. As explained above, we favor Euler—equation
estimates that employ data only for ages 25 and beyond; consequently, Table 5 presents
results based on Table 2 coeﬃcients for samples with ages 25-79, 30-79, and 35-79. The
bottom panel of Table 5 shows that liquidity constraint (8) makes little diﬀerence to our
estimation.
22Table 5. Structural Parameters: Combine Consumption—Euler Equation
Coeﬃcients (Table 2) and Retirement—Age Estimate from HRS (Table 4)a
Struc— Consumption Regression Sample:
tural
Para— Female Female Female
meter Age 25-79 Age 30-79 Age 35-79
Formulation with Liquidity Constraint (8)
Gamma -0.5840 -0.5874 -0.4969
(S.E.) (0.1320) (0.1407) (0.1589)
[95% Conﬁd.] [-0.8428,-0.3252] [-0.8631,-0.3117] [-0.8082,-0.1855]
Alpha 0.280 0.2809 0.2802
(S.E.) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0033)
[95% Conﬁd.] [0.2754,0.2858] [0.2752,0.2866] [0.2738,0.2867]
Rho 0.0119 0.0117 0.0137
(S.E.) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0028)
[95% Conﬁd.] [0.0086,0.0153] [0.0076,0.0158] [0.0081,0.0193]
Alpha*Gamma -0.1639 -0.1650 -0.1392
(S.E.) (0.0964) (0.1027) (0.1207)
[95% Conﬁd.] [-0.3528,0.0250] [-0.3662,0.0362] [-0.3759,0.0974]
Addendum: Female Age Last Binding Liquidity Constraint (Simulated)
(Yr, Mth) (30,11) (30,11) (30,11)
Formulation Omitting Liquidity Constraint (8)
Gamma -0.5741 -0.5776 -0.4881
(S.E.) (0.1291) (0.1376) (0.1558)
[95% Conﬁd.] [-0.8272,-0.3210] [-0.8477,-0.3076] [-0.7936,-0.1827]
Alpha 0.2728 0.2732 0.2716
(S.E.) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0046)
[95% Conﬁd.] [0.2662,0.2794] [0.2657,0.2808] [0.2626,0.2806]
Rho 0.0121 0.0119 0.0139
(S.E.) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0028)
[95% Conﬁd.] [0.0088,0.0155] [0.0078,0.0159] [0.0084,0.0194]
Alpha*Gamma -0.1566 -0.1578 -0.1326
(S.E.) (0.0943) (0.1007) (0.1188)
[95% Conﬁd.] [-0.3415,0.0283] [-0.3552,0.0396] [-0.3654,0.1002]
Addendum: Lowest Simulated Net Worth (Excluding Capitalized Social Security Beneﬁts)
YR 2000 Dollars -36,861 -36,088 -40,406
a. See text.
23As noted in the introduction, our estimates of gamma, alpha, and rho are similar to
a number of calibrations in the literature. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ’s [1987]
favorite calibration has γ = −3, α (roughly) = .4, and ρ = .015; Altig et al. [2001] use
γ = −3, α (roughly) = .5, and ρ = .004; and, Cooley and Prescott [1995] set γ =0 ,
α = .36, and ρ = .053.
Our results may be compared with estimates that have identiﬁed the IES from ex-
pected changes interest rates. Using aggregate consumption data Hall [1988], Cambell
and Mankiw [1989], and Patterson and Pesaran [1992], for example, estimate the IES for
consumption to be very nearly zero. Micro studies tend to estimate larger intertemporal
elasticities. Banks et al. [1998], for instance, estimate the average IES for consumption to
be approximately 0.5. In another example, Attanasio and Weber [1993] estimate an IES for
consumption of approximately 0.75 from micro data.20 Although we use a very diﬀerent
source of variation to identify the IES, our estimates are similar to, if on the larger end
of, those obtained in micro studies from the change in consumption growth with expected
changes in interest rates.
As a check of the validity of the model, we note that if our a priori beliefs imply that
the subjective rate of time discount must be non-negative (ρ ≥ 0), our constant term in
Table 3 alone puts a lower bound on γ (c.f. Weil [1989]). In particular, suppose that ages
s and t fall before retirement but after liquidity constraint (8) has ceased to bind and that
household composition is the same at both ages. As in (2),
u (cs)=e(r−ρ)·(t−s) · u (ct);
so, if β1 is our estimated constant from Table 2, we have
u (cs)=e(r−ρ)·(t−s) · u (cs · eβ1·(t−s)) ⇐⇒
r − ρ
1 − α · γ
= β1 .
If ρ ≥ 0, it follows that
r
β1
− 1 ≥− α · γ .
With r = .05 · (1 − .1428), β1 = .0261 from Table 3, and α about .25, we then expect
γ ∈ [−2.56,1.0]. All of the estimates of Table 5, in fact, fall comfortably within this
interval, though the derivation of Table 5 in no way imposes ρ ≥ 0.
As stated, our estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is closer to
1.0 than many in the literature. Haider and Stephens [2004] argue that earlier—than—
anticipated retirement on the part of some households may bias one’s estimate of the av-
erage decline in consumption at retirement upward by one third. Aguiar and Hurst [2004]
20 Barsky et al. [1997] use hypothetical questions to estimate an IES distribution for
their sample. They ﬁnd an average IES of 0.2, with less than 20% of respondents having
an IES greater than 0.3. Others who have attempted to estimate a distribution of in-
tertemporal elasticities of substitution ﬁnd evidence that the IES is increasing with wealth
(e.g., Blundell et al. [1994]).
24argue that the decline tends to be overstated because increases in home production, includ-
ing shopping time, allow retirees to obtain more consumption per dollar of expenditure.
On the one hand, the latter may be interpreted as somewhat similar in spirit to increased
t i m ef o rl e i s u r ei no u rm o d e l .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,as m a l l e re m p i r i c a ld e c l i n ei nc o n s u m p -
tion at retirement would tend to move our estimated IES even closer to the zero—change
logarithmic case, where the IES is 1.0. For example, if we diminish our consumption drop
by one third in the middle column at the top of Table 5, our point estimates for gamma and
alpha become -.37 and .28, respectively; thus, our point estimate of the IES for consump-
tion/leisure service ﬂows rises from .63 to .73, and our estimate of the IES for consumption
alone rises from .86 to .91.
Finally, we believe that our analysis suggests a coherent description of the practical role
of liquidity constraints in the life—cycle model. Ostensibly, our results seem contradictory:
Tables 2-3 show evidence of binding liquidity constraints only through (female) age 22, but
Table 5 ﬁnds binding constraints through (female) age 30. One pattern in all solutions of
our model, however, is that constraint (8) binds, if at all, only at the beginning of life. If it
binds then, the reason is that future earnings are high in youth relative to current earnings
– making young households wish they could borrow against their future prosperity. In
comparing our diﬀerent tables, notice that the simulations of Table 5 apply to a cohort
that began working in the mid 1950s. At that time, especially in the 1960s, technological
progress was unusually fast, causing exceptionally rapid earnings growth. The young
households of Tables 2-3, in contrast, began working in the mid 1980s and the 1990s. The
time dummy variables from the male earnings regression generating Table A1 suggest an
average annual rate of technological progress 1960-1970 about 3 percent per year faster
than over 1980-2000. If we ﬁx preference parameters from the middle column of Table 5 but
lower household earnings growth for 1960-69 annually by 2 percent, renormalizing the level
over all years to keep average lifetime earnings the same as before, we ﬁnd that liquidity
constraint (8) binds only through (female) age 27. If we reduce the growth rate 1960-69
by 3 percent using the same steps, the liquidity constraint never binds at all. Evidently,
having the constraint bind in youth is a knife—edge phenomenon heavily dependent upon
the general rate of earnings growth at the time. In the end, we believe that Tables 2-3 and
5 are fully consistent: according to the model, peak growth rates over the period 1950-2000
can cause young households to hit liquidity constraints for almost their ﬁrst decade; more
normal macroeconomic growth can make constraint (8) virtually irrelevant.
6. Household Net Worth
In each wave, the HRS collects data on household net worth. This section compares
simulated net worth from our model with the survey data. As preceding sections make
no reference to wealth data, the reader can view the new comparisons as providing an
out—of—sample evaluation of our model and parameter estimates. There is a second reason
the new comparisons are interesting: in contrast to many existing studies, our frame-
work incorporates “consumption paradox” behavior, which should tend to decrease wealth
accumulation prior to retirement.
Table A2, Appendix III, presents summary statistics on HRS net worth. Survey “net
worth” consists of ﬁnancial assets, equity in own business, real estate, and automobiles
25– less debt. Our model focuses on married couples, and the table shows that they have
more wealth than average. Although our model implicitly includes private—pension equity
in household net worth, pre—retirement HRS net worth excludes deﬁned—beneﬁtp e n s i o n
plans; thus, we further specialize our attention to married couples who are retired, and
we capitalize the pension ﬂows that they report. Row 3 of the table shows that retired
couples are somewhat wealthier than couples in general; row 4 shows that private pensions
augment other wealth by about one quarter. Row 5 capitalizes Social Security Beneﬁts as
well, which provides a measure of net worth that is nearly always positive.
We then regress log comprehensive net worth on year, male age, and years since
(male) retirement – see Table A3, Appendix III. The regression restricts the sample to
couples whose male retired at age 59-65, and for each such couple, it uses the ﬁrst valid
net worth observation. We use log net worth as our dependent variable (omitting the ﬁve
observations for which net worth is zero or negative – see Table A2) because we believe the
regressors should register percentage changes. Section 5 estimates an average retirement
age of 62.5; thus, we use the regression of Table A3 to predict comprehensive net worth at
male ages 62 and 63. We make the predictions for households in which the wife (assumed
two years junior to her husband) reaches 65 in the year 2000. In the case of retirement
age 62, for instance, if the standard error for our new net worth regression is s,t h en e w
regression coeﬃcients are (ζ1,...,ζ22),
v ≡ (1,0,.5,.5,0,...,0),
and the matrix of regressors in Table A3 is X, predicted net worth is
h(ζ ,s ) ≡ e
22
i=1 vi·ζi+.5·s2+.5·v ·[X ·X]−1·v·s2
.
Using maximum likelihood estimates of the covariance matrix for (ζ ,s ), the delta method
provides a conﬁdence interval.
Table 6 compares our model’s simulated net worth at retirement to our corresponding
estimates from the HRS. The estimates of comprehensive net worth at retirement ages 62
and 63 from the data, $719,000 and $736,000, respectively, closely match the corresponding
values from simulations with liquidity constraint (8) – with simulated values from the
model being about 5 percent lower than estimates from the data. Simulations based on
formulations of the model without the liquidity constraint are about 10 percent lower than
values from the data. Household heterogeneity, and perhaps measurement error, make the
95 percent conﬁdence intervals for our predictions from the data extremely wide (as the
coeﬃcient of variation in Table A2 foreshadows).
In the end, our simulations quite closely agree with point estimates of comprehensive
net worth from the HRS. We should note, however, that, as is the case with most surveys,
the HRS does not pay special attention to the wealthiest families. The best known survey
that provides a high income sample is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF
2001 (e.g., Aizcorbe et al. [2003, Table 3]) seems to show noticeably more net worth than
Table A2.21 We think of our model as being calibrated to the U.S. population excluding the
extreme upper tail of the wealth distribution – with an analysis of the latter presumably
21 We can compare the mean of $342,000 and median $143,000 from row 1 of Table A2
26Table 6. Comprehensive Household Net Worth (Including Capitalized Pension
and Social Security Beneﬁts) Predicted from Life—Cycle Model (Estimated Beta




Simulation of Estimated Life—Cycle Model
Model Incorporating $686,000 $696,000
Liquidity Constraints
Model Omitting $656,000 $666,000
Liquidity Constraints
3. HRS Data: Prediction from Regression on Data from Last Row Table A2b
Mean $719,000 $736,000
[95% Conﬁd.] [458000, 979000] [598000, 873000]
a. Male age (all households here headed by couples).
b. Omitting negative and zero values, we regress log total net worth on a constant,
survey—wave and male age dummies, and years since male retirement. The sample is
retired couples whose male retired age 59-65. Assuming wives are two years younger
than their husbands, we predict net worth for households whose wife turned 65 in 2000.
requiring a description of intentional bequests (e.g., Modigliani [1986], Laitner [2001], and
others).
7. Conclusions
A number of recent papers describe a substantial drop in household expenditures at
retirement, a drop that some argue demonstrates the limits of a strictly rational life—cycle
model. This paper reconciles the life-cycle saving model with the “retirement-consumption
puzzle,” and then uses the empirical change in expenditure at retirement to provide a new
and, we believe, attractive source of identiﬁcation for parameters of the life—cycle model.
We show that a tractable life—cycle speciﬁcation with nonseparable intratemporal
utility, and with work options that are discrete, predicts a discontinuous change in con-
sumption at retirement. We then show that if one is willing to thus treat the change in
with SCF family net worth (see Aizcorbe) for head 55-64 (2001 dollars): 1995, mean
$442,000 and median $133,000; 1998, mean $579,000 and median $139,000; 2001, mean
$727,000 and median $182,000.
27household consumption at retirement as a consequence of purposeful behavior, the magni-
tude of the change provides useful information for estimating life—cycle model parameters,
especially the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Intuitively, if a household’s taste for
intertemporal smoothing is suﬃciently high, it will choose to decrease its consumption at
retirement so that lost utility from consumption oﬀsets gains from additional leisure. If it
has a lower desire for intertemporal smoothing, on the other hand, the household might
want to increase its consumption at retirement to take advantage of the complementarity
of consumption and leisure. The size, and sign, of the consumption change play a crucial
role in our estimation of households’ IES.
Our strategy of using the consumption-retirement puzzle to estimate life-cycle param-
eters provides information about the robustness of existing IES estimates to variation in
method of estimation and decision domain. In addition, our method has the advantage
that it estimates the IES from changes associated with a highly predictable and consequen-
tial life event – retirement. The standard approach, which instruments for asset returns
in period t + 1 using economic variables known in period t,s u ﬀers from the problems of
weak instruments. We argue that, in this sense, changes in consumption at retirement
oﬀer a more robust and credible source of variation from which to estimate this critical
parameter.
We implement our identiﬁcation strategy using pseudo—panel data from the U.S. Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey 1984-2001 to estimate a consumption-Euler equation. The es-
timated coeﬃcients from that equation provide composites of the structural parameters
of our life—cycle model. As in previous studies, we ﬁnd a substantial average drop in
household expenditure at retirement. Combining the consumption coeﬃcients with life-
time earnings proﬁles from Health and Retirement Study panel data, we use the model’s
prediction of the optimal retirement age, together with HRS data on retirement, to extract
estimates of the structural parameters of the model.
Despite our distinctive method, we estimate intertemporal elasticity parameters that
are consistent with, if on the higher end of, those found and used in the literature. We
estimate, with considerable precision, an IES for services of approximately 0.67 and an
IES for consumption of 0.87.
Our estimated model performs well when we compare its predictions about retirement
wealth holdings with actual wealth data from the HRS (which did not inform our estima-
tion), and the model interestingly suggests that liquidity constraints may play a role in
determining the path of consumption at young ages. Because the model is especially well
suited for studying retirement behavior, our future work will use our estimates to perform
policy experiments to obtain quantitative predictions of, for example, the eﬀects of possible
Social Security reforms on the labor supply of older Americans.
28Appendix I: Further Adjustments of the CEX Data
This paper makes three additional adjustments to the CEX data.
First, we subdivide “shelter” into “services from own house” and “other.” We scale
the latter as we do other categories, but we drop the CEX “services from own house”
and impute a substitute that allocates the annual NIPA total service ﬂow from residential
houses to the CEX in proportion to CEX reported house values.
Second, CEX medical expenditures are far too low. Reasons include the omissions of
employer contributions to health insurance and services that Medicare covers. We annually,
proportionately, and for every age adjust CEX expenditures on private health insurance
to match the Department of Health and Human Services total for all premiums for private
health insurance; and, we adjust out—of—po c k e th e a l t hs p e n d i n gf r o mt h eC E Xt om a t c h
annual DHHS totals.22 Turning to Medicare, funding for the beneﬁts comes from a hospital
insurance (HI) tax on wages and salaries, monthly premiums for supplementary medical
insurance (SMI) from people currently eligible for beneﬁts, and contributions from general
t a xr e v e n u e st oS M I .T h eC E Xr e g i s t e r so n l ySMI premiums from participants; so, we
allocate the yearly total of Medicare beneﬁts (both HI and all SMI expenditure) to the
CEX sample in proportion to SMI premium payments (principally for people over 65).23
Third, the NIPA “personal business” category includes bank and brokerage fees, many
of which are hidden in the form of low interest on saving accounts, fees deducted from
mutual fund income, etc., and hence absent from expenditures which CEX households
perceive. We assume that bank and brokerage fees make their way into the life—cycle
model in the form of lower—than—otherwise interest rates on saving; therefore, we normalize
annual personal business expenditures measured in the CEX to match the corresponding
NIPA amount less bank and brokerage fees, and omit bank and brokerage fees from our
measure of consumption.
Appendix II: Lifetime Earnings
See Table A1.
Appendix III: HRS Household Net Worth
See Tables A2-A3.
22 See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/burden-of-health-care-costs/table01.asp. The
annual ﬁgures cover 1987-2000. We extrapolate to 1984-86 and 2001 using the growth rate
of NIPA total medical consumption.
23 For HI expenditures, see Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 2001,
table 8.A1; for SMI receipts and receipts from participant premiums, see table 8.A2.
29Table A1. Representative Household Aftertax, Total Compensation
Estimated from HRS, Imputed Household Social Security Beneﬁt,
and Imputed Household Medicare Beneﬁt; Male Retirement
Age 62; Female Retirement Age 60; Year 2000 Dollarsa
Pre—retirement
Male Male/Female Male Male/Female
Age Earnings Age Earnings
24 13839/3255 43 44412/9407
25 15294/3813 44 44084/10168
26 16780/3714 45 43512/10973
27 18215/3602 46 42896/11721
28 20252/3513 47 42289/12321
29 22384/3505 48 42532/12667
30 24540/3673 49 42800/13118
31 26658/3710 50 43017/13593
32 28788/3778 51 43192/13985
33 31224/4139 52 43198/14329
34 33532/4482 53 43089/14650
35 35911/4839 54 42803/15054
36 38321/5335 55 42572/15655
37 40805/5852 56 42405/16263
38 41672/6325 57 42142/16643
39 42449/6856 58 42985/17291
40 43206/7538 59 43667/17856
41 43857/7963 60 44191/18266
42 44605/8502 61 44420/18770
Post—retirement
Male Household Male Household
Age SSB/Medicare Beneﬁt Age SSB/Medicare Beneﬁt
62-63 12383/0 67-74 18575/10623
64 18575/0 75-82 12383/5312
65-66 18575/5312
a. See text.
30Table A2. HRS Net Worth (Yr 2000 Dollars)a
Weighted Sample:c
Obser—
Sample vationsb Mean Median Coef.
Var.
Financial Respondent 40023 $342,000 $143,000 3.02
Reporting Net Worth
Preceding Row 24626 $426,000 $200,000 2.58
and Married
Preceding Row 2821 $485,000 $278,000 1.87
and Retiredd
Preceding Row, Add 2821 $614,000 $411,000 1.53
Capitalized
Private Pensione
Preceding Row, Add 2821 $756,000 $553,000 1.26
Capitalized
Social Security Beneﬁtsf
Addendum: Signs in Preceding Row
Negative Zero Positive
Observations 2 3 2816
a. See text.
b. Waves 1992, 1994,..., 2004; hence, maximum of 6 observations per household.
c. HRS household weights.
d. Couple “retired” (i) if male never worked or self—characterized as retired, retirement
age ≥ 40, and positive Social Security beneﬁt ﬂow; and (ii) if spouse never
worked or self—characterized as retired.
e. Pension ﬂows capitalized at r · (1 − τ)w h e r er = .05 if cola, otherwise r = .075; and τ = .1428.
Mortality: male age 74; female age 80. If survey reports “pension continues at death,”
spouse receives full pension share after respondent’s death; if “pension reduced at death,”
spouse receives half share after respondent’s death; otherwise, we assume pension ﬂow
stops with respondent’s death. We multiply all survey pension ﬂows by 1 − τ.
f. After age 62, spouse receives larger of one—half husband’s Social Security beneﬁta n do w nb e n e ﬁt.
After husband’s death, spouse receives larger of own and husband’s beneﬁt.
We multiply all Social Security beneﬁt ﬂows by 1 − τ/2.
31Table A3. Regression of Log Comprehensive Net Worth
from Retired, HRS Couples, on a Constant, Year and
Male Age Dummy Variables, and Years Since Male Retirement;
HRS Household Weights; Male Retirement Age 59-65a
Parameter Coeﬃcient St. Err. TS t a t
CONSTANT 13.4315 0.1848 72.6673
1992 WAVE -0.4976 0.0991 -5.0214
1994 WAVE -0.1494 0.1041 -1.4344
1996 WAVE -0.3476 0.0865 -4.0185
1998 WAVE -0.3079 0.0846 -3.6387
2002 WAVE -0.1115 0.0823 -1.3549
MALE AGE 59 0.0302 0.2662 0.1134
MALE AGE 60 -0.4110 0.2930 -1.4027
MALE AGE 61 -0.1171 0.3028 -0.3867
MALE AGE 63 0.1350 0.1839 0.7341
MALE AGE 64 0.2076 0.1803 1.1511
MALE AGE 65 0.0579 0.1838 0.3151
MALE AGE 66 0.1264 0.1951 0.6481
MALE AGE 67 0.2009 0.2086 0.9630
MALE AGE 68 0.0702 0.2205 0.3186
MALE AGE 69 -0.1975 0.2187 -0.9030
MALE AGE 70 0.0011 0.2303 0.0048
MALE AGE 71 0.0445 0.2421 0.1840
MALE AGE 72 -0.5527 0.2868 -1.9270
MALE AGE 73 -0.0615 0.2939 -0.2092
MALE AGE 74 -0.5116 0.3736 -1.3691




Mean Square Error .5717
a. See text.
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